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24 
NAMUDNO’S NON-EXISTENT PRINCIPLE 
OF STATE EQUALITY 
ZACHARY S. PRICE 
INTRODUCTION 
The fifty states are unequal in many respects—population (and 
thus representation in the House of Representatives), wealth, re-
sources, climate, economic foundations, and industrial and techno-
logical development, to name a few. Federal legislation, therefore, 
often affects states unequally, and at times even singles out particular 
states for special treatment. Is such legislation suspect? In dicta in 
Northwest Austin Municipal Utility District Number One v. Holder 
(NAMUDNO), the Supreme Court cryptically suggested that it might 
be.1 This term, in Shelby County v. Holder, the Court is poised to re-
visit the issue presented in NAMUDNO: whether section 5 of the 
Voting Rights Act (VRA),2 which imposes special requirements on 
certain states and jurisdictions with histories of discrimination, is con-
stitutional.3 In the process, the Court could choose to give the 
NAMUDNO dicta some bite. 
The Court should not do so. The suggestion that federal legisla-
tion must treat states equally is a chimera, without support in consti-
tutional text, history, or precedent. It is particularly unfounded with 
respect to legislation, like section 5 of the VRA, that is based on 
Congress’s authority under the Fourteenth and Fifteenth 
Amendments to eradicate discriminatory denials of the right to vote. 
A constitutional requirement that legislation cannot treat states dif-
ferently would call into question many typical legislative acts. The 
idea should be put to rest before it causes mischief. 
 
  Copyright © 2013 by Zachary S. Price, Fellow, Constitutional Law Center, Stanford 
Law School. J.D., 2003, Harvard Law School; A.B., 1998, Stanford University. The author 
is grateful for helpful comments on earlier drafts from Will Baude, Nathan Chapman, and 
Michael McConnell. 
 1  557 U.S. 193, 203 (2009).  
 2  Voting Rights Act of 1965, Pub. L. No. 89-110, § 5, 79 Stat. 437, 439 (codified as 
amended at 42 U.S.C. § 1973c (2006)). 
 3  See Shelby Cnty. v. Holder, 133 S. Ct. 594 (2012) (granting certiorari on the 
question “[w]hether Congress’ decision in 2006 to reauthorize Section 5 of the Voting 
Rights Act [u]nder the pre-existing coverage formula of Section 4(b) of the Voting Rights 
Act exceeded its authority under the Fourteenth and Fifteenth Amendments and thus 
violated the Tenth Amendment and Article IV of the United States Constitution”). 
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I 
NAMUDNO’S DICTA, CONGRESSIONAL PRACTICE, AND THE 
CONSTITUTIONAL TEXT 
Section 5 of the VRA requires covered states and local jurisdic-
tions to obtain “pre-clearance” from the Attorney General or a three-
judge district court in Washington, D.C., before making certain 
changes to election rules, procedures, or districts.4 In NAMUDNO, a 
covered jurisdiction challenged the constitutionality of this statute.5 
Two constitutional amendments adopted during Reconstruction 
after the Civil War provide possible authority for Congress’s enact-
ment of section 5 of the VRA.6 Under the Fifteenth Amendment, the 
“right of citizens of the United States to vote shall not be denied or 
abridged by the United States or by any State on account of race, 
color, or previous condition of servitude”; Congress has the “power to 
enforce this article by appropriate legislation.”7 The Fourteenth 
Amendment guarantees the “equal protection of the laws” to all per-
sons; it too permits Congress to enforce this guarantee with “appro-
priate legislation.”8 
The NAMUDNO petitioners argued that Congress could not im-
pose section 5 requirements on them, even pursuant to Congress’s 
Fourteenth and Fifteenth Amendment enforcement powers, without 
a more specific showing that those requirements remedied ongoing 
discrimination in the jurisdiction.9 The Court identified the constitu-
tional questions presented by the statute as “serious,” but managed to 
avoid them by adopting a saving construction of the statute.10 
Specifically, the Court interpreted the statute to allow the jurisdiction 
to apply to be removed from section 5’s coverage under a so-called 
“bailout” provision of the VRA.11 
 
 4  42 U.S.C. § 1973c(a) (2006). Section 4(b) of the VRA contains the formula that 
determines which jurisdictions are subject to section 5.  See id. §§ 1973b(b), 1973c(a). 
 5  557 U.S. at 196. 
 6  With respect to federal elections, Congress has authority under the original, 
unamended Constitution to “make or alter” state regulations regarding the time, place, 
and manner of holding elections for U.S. senators and representatives. U.S. CONST. art. I, 
§ 4. Its authority over laws and procedures governing elections for state offices, however, 
depends on the Reconstruction Amendments. 
 7  U.S. CONST. amend. XV. 
 8  U.S. CONST. amend. XIV. 
 9  See NAMUDNO, 557 U.S. at 200–01 (stating that there is no evidence that the 
district ever discriminated based on race and indicating that petitioners argued the section 
5 requirements were unconstitutional unless the district could escape section 5’s coverage).  
 10  Id. at 204. 
 11  See id. at 206–11 (interpreting section 4(b) of the VRA, 42 U.S.C. § 1973b(a)(1)(A) 
(2006), so that the utility district qualified as a “political subdivision” and thus could apply 
for bailout from section 5’s coverage). 
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In discussing the difficulty of the constitutional issue, the Court 
focused on the issue of congressional power.12 But it also suggested, 
albeit cryptically, that the statute’s unequal treatment of states might 
be grounds to view the VRA with suspicion. The Court’s discussion of 
the constitutionality of disparate treatment of states was contained in 
a single paragraph: 
The Act also differentiates between the States, despite our historic 
tradition that all the States enjoy “equal sovereignty.” United States 
v. Louisiana, 363 U.S. 1, 16 (1960) (citing Lessee of Pollard v. 
Hagan, 3 How. 212, 223 (1845)); see also Texas v. White, 7 Wall. 
700, 725–726 (1869). Distinctions can be justified in some cases. 
“The doctrine of the equality of States . . . does not bar . . . reme-
dies for local evils which have subsequently appeared.” 
Katzenbach, supra, at 328–329 (emphasis added). But a departure 
from the fundamental principle of equal sovereignty requires a 
showing that a statute’s disparate geographic coverage is suffi-
ciently related to the problem that it targets.13 
What does this paragraph mean? It purports to identify a “tradi-
tion” of “equal sovereignty” for states and suggests that this tradition 
necessitates scrutiny of legislation focused on purely “local evils.”14 
The implication would seem to be that heightened scrutiny applies to 
legislation that treats states unequally. Yet the opinion avoids com-
mitting to that conclusion. It simply notes that a sufficient showing is 
required to support such legislation—without saying what that suffi-
cient showing is. 
The default rule, of course, is that the Constitution requires only 
that Congress have a rational basis for the legislation it enacts. Courts 
instead apply strict or intermediate scrutiny under the Fifth and 
Fourteenth Amendments to laws that burden fundamental rights or 
draw classifications based on protected categories, such as race or 
gender.15 Strict scrutiny is nearly always fatal to legislation; it requires 
a showing that the legislation is narrowly tailored to a compelling 
 
 12  See id. at 204 (asking whether “Congress exceeded its Fifteenth Amendment 
enforcement power in extending the preclearance requirements”).  
 13  Id. at 203. 
 14  Id. 
 15  See, e.g., Adarand Constructors, Inc. v. Pena, 515 U.S. 200, 224–25 (1995) 
(distinguishing between “political judgments [that] are the product of rough compromise 
struck by contending groups within the democratic process” and suspect classifications 
that “touch upon an individual’s race or ethnic background” (quoting Regents of the Univ. 
of Cal. v. Bakke, 438 U.S. 265, 299 (1978) (opinion of Powell, J.))); United States v. 
Carolene Prods. Co., 304 U.S. 144, 152–53 n.4 (1938) (indicating that more exacting 
scrutiny may be appropriate where legislation “appears on its face to be within a specific 
prohibition of the Constitution” or where it implicates “prejudice against discrete and 
insular minorities”). 
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governmental interest. Intermediate scrutiny, which applies to gender 
classifications, similarly requires a showing that legislation is closely 
tailored to an important governmental objective. In contrast, under 
rational basis review, legislation may be significantly over- or under-
inclusive, meaning that Congress can impose requirements on 
significantly more or significantly fewer people than would be strictly 
necessary to remedy the problem the legislation addresses. To give an 
example in terms of states, under a rational basis framework, 
Congress might properly choose—as it did in the Clean Air Act16—to 
permit one state to take the lead in setting more stringent vehicle 
emissions standards, even if this choice is under-inclusive in that other 
states just as well have played that standard-setting role. 
States do not need the form of protection from the ordinary po-
litical process that heightened scrutiny (strict or intermediate) pro-
vides. One common rationale for heightened scrutiny is that it 
provides judicial protection for unpopular groups and activities that 
the ordinary political process might not adequately protect against 
unfavorable treatment.17 While it is conceivable that a majority of 
states in Congress could routinely gang up on a single state or a mi-
nority group of states, the Constitution provides states with substan-
tial means of political self-defense. Such means include, most 
significantly, the requirement that each state (regardless of size) have 
an equal number of senators in the Senate; other examples are the 
guarantees of state representation in the House of Representatives 
and Electoral College.18 
The text of the Constitution, moreover, implies the absence of a 
general principle of state equality by mandating some forms of equal 
treatment but not others. In addition to equal representation in the 
Senate, states hold equivalent sovereign immunity and residual sov-
ereign powers under the Tenth and Eleventh Amendments, as well as 
protection against unequal “Duties, Imposts, and Excises” or 
“Preference[s] . . . given by any Regulation of Commerce or Revenue 
to the Ports of one State over those of another.”19 Courts, to be sure, 
 
 16  42 U.S.C. §§ 7543, 7545 (2006).  
 17  See, e.g., Carolene Prods. Co., 304 U.S. at 153 n.4 (explaining protection for 
“discrete and insular minorities” on the grounds that prejudice against them “tends 
seriously to curtail the operation of those political processes ordinarily to be relied upon to 
protect minorities”).  
 18  See generally Herbert Wechsler, The Political Safeguards of Federalism: The Role of 
the States in the Composition and Selection of the National Government, 54 COLUM. L. 
REV. 543, 546 (1954) (emphasizing that state interests are protected from national 
legislation principally by “their crucial role in the selection and the composition of the 
national authority”). 
 19  U.S. CONST. art. I, § 8, cl. 1; id. § 9, cl. 6. 
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have interpreted the Constitution to provide various “unenumerated” 
rights that are not specifically identified in the text, and some consti-
tutional federalism principles lack a specific textual foundation.20 
Nevertheless, at least in the absence of some compelling reason to in-
fer a constitutional principle of state equality, the specificity of 
guarantees such as the Tax Uniformity Clause and the Port 
Preference Clause suggests that no general rule otherwise guards 
states against unequal treatment in federal legislation. 
Congress routinely enacts legislation that presumes only a ra-
tional basis is necessary for unequal treatment of states. For example, 
benefits formulas may result in unequal distribution of funds, de-
pending on where eligible beneficiaries (whether individuals, school 
districts, foundations, or other parties) reside.21 The notorious 
congressional “earmarks”—line items funding particular parties or 
projects—that litter annual appropriations bills single out particular 
entities, localities, or even states for federal largesse.22 Congress 
sometimes establishes pilot projects that test particular federal initia-
tives in one state or several states before imposing them on the nation 
as a whole.23 Congress may commit federal property to particular pur-
poses that impose costs or burdens on the state where the property is 
located. A recent statute, for example, designated federal property in 
Nevada as a storage site for much of the nation’s nuclear waste.24 To 
 
 20  See, e.g., Alden v. Maine, 527 U.S. 706, 713 (1999) (holding that states’ sovereign 
immunity “neither derives from, nor is limited by, the terms of the Eleventh 
Amendment”); Printz v. United States, 521 U.S. 898, 905–25 (1997) (concluding that 
Congress cannot “commandeer[]” state officials based on “historical understanding and 
practice,” “the structure of the Constitution,” and “the jurisprudence of [the Supreme] 
Court”). See generally John F. Manning, Federalism and the Generality Problem in 
Constitutional Interpretation, 122 HARV. L. REV. 2003, 2005 (2009) (discussing recent 
decisions enforcing “what might be termed unenumerated states’ rights”). 
 21  See, e.g., 20 U.S.C. § 1411 (2006) (special education funding); 23 U.S.C. § 104 
(highway funding); 42 U.S.C. § 1396d (medical assistance formula). 
 22  See, e.g., Water Resources Development Act of 2007, Pub. L. No. 110-114, §§ 3001–
3182, 121 Stat. 1041, 1106–70 (codified as amended in scattered sections of 33 U.S.C.) 
(appropriating funds for various specified navigation-related projects); Consolidated and 
Further Continuing Appropriations Act, 2012, Pub. L. No. 112-55, § 727, 112 Stat. 553, 585 
(Nov. 18, 2011) (appropriating funds for the Washington Metropolitan Area Transit 
Authority); Disaster Relief Appropriations Act, 2012, Pub. L. No. 112-77, 125 Stat. 1277, 
1277 (2011) (appropriating funds for repairs on the Mississippi River and its tributaries). 
 23  See, e.g., 42 U.S.C. § 280g-6 (Supp. V 2012) (authorizing the Secretary of Health and 
Human Services to select “at least 3 states” for pilot projects relating to chronic kidney 
disease); Consolidated and Further Continuing Appropriations Act, 2012, Pub. L. No. 112-
55, div. A, tit. VII, § 727, 125 Stat. 552, 585 (2011) (funding a pilot project to test 
reforestation techniques in Gulf Coast areas); tit. III, 125 Stat. at 567 (appropriating funds 
“to conduct a demonstration” regarding certain public housing programs).  
 24  See 42 U.S.C. § 10133 (2006) (establishing certain requirements with respect to the 
Yucca Mountain facility for storage of nuclear waste). 
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be sure, Congress’s discretion with respect to such legislation regard-
ing federal spending and property is particularly broad,25 but at times 
Congress has even imposed regulatory burdens unequally. One ex-
ample is the Clean Air Act, which, as indicated above, permits one 
state (California) to establish its own more stringent motor vehicle 
emissions and engine design standards while requiring other states to 
follow either California’s standards or standards established by the 
federal government.26 
Courts have never before considered such legislation suspect.27 In 
perhaps the most thorough consideration of the issue to date, the 
D.C. Circuit rejected arguments that the location of the federal nu-
clear waste facility in Nevada violated a constitutional principle of 
state equal treatment.28 Although Nevada argued that the facility’s 
selection violated a constitutional requirement that federal legislation 
treat states equally, the D.C. Circuit found “no basis in the 
Constitution” for Nevada’s argument.29 
In short, to the extent that the Court in NAMUDNO implied 
that legislation treating states unequally should receive heightened 
 
 25  See, e.g., Kleppe v. New Mexico, 426 U.S. 529, 536 (1976) (“[W]e must remain 
mindful that, while courts must eventually pass upon them, determinations under the 
Property Clause are entrusted primarily to the judgment of Congress.”); Helvering v. 
Davis, 301 U.S. 619, 640 (1937) (“[D]iscretion [over spending] belongs to Congress, unless 
the choice is clearly wrong, a display of arbitrary power, not an exercise of judgment.”).  
 26  42 U.S.C. §§ 7543, 7545 (2006). Another example is the Professional and Amateur 
Sports Protection Act (PAPSA), a 1992 law that generally prohibits sports gambling but 
exempts four states and allowed a fifth (New Jersey) to opt into the exception by enacting 
legislation within a one-year period (which the state failed to do). 28 U.S.C. §§ 3701–3704 
(2006); see also Nat’l Collegiate Athletic Ass’n v. Christie, Civ. Action No. 12-4947 (MAS) 
(LHG), 2013 WL 772679, at *3–4 (D.N.J. Feb. 28, 2013) (explaining the operation of the 
statute and exceptions). A statute from the early years of the Republic granted jurisdiction 
over certain federal revenue offenses only to specified state courts in New York and 
Pennsylvania. Act of Mar. 8, 1806, 2 Stat. 354; see also Act of Apr. 21, 1808, 2 Stat. 489 
(removing a sunset on the 1806 statute and extending the same jurisdiction to certain 
courts in Ohio). For an example from a recent appropriations statute, see Consolidated 
and Further Continuing Appropriations Act, 2012, Pub. L. No. 112-55, div. C, tit. II, § 211, 
125 Stat. 552, 695 (2011), which exempted “[a] public housing agency or such other entity 
that administers Federal housing assistance for the Housing Authority of the county of 
Los Angeles, California, the States of Alaska, Iowa, and Mississippi” from a requirement 
that such entities include a resident on their respective governing bodies. 
 27  A federal court recently rejected a constitutional challenge to PAPSA. See Christie, 
2013 WL 772679, at *2. Courts also have rejected challenges to the Clean Air Act 
provisions granting special regulatory powers only to California. E.g., Engine Mfrs. Ass’n 
v. S. Coast Air Quality Mgmt. Dist., 498 F.3d 1031 (9th Cir. 2007); Ass’n of Int’l Auto. 
Mfrs., Inc. v. Comm’r, Mass. Dep’t of Envtl. Prot., 208 F.3d 1 (1st Cir. 2000); Am. Auto. 
Mfrs. Ass’n v. Cahill, 152 F.3d 196 (2d Cir. 1998); Virginia v. EPA, 108 F.3d 1397 (D.C. 
Cir. 1997). 
 28  See Nuclear Energy Inst. v. EPA, 373 F.3d 1251, 1303–09 (D.C. Cir. 2004). 
 29  Id. at 1305. 
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scrutiny, the NAMUDNO dicta conflict with substantial and 
longstanding congressional practice, have no direct support in the 
Constitution’s text, and are inconsistent with prior lower court case 
law. 
II 
AN INTUITION IN SEARCH OF A THEORY 
The Court seemed to derive its intuition that federal legislation 
must treat states equally from two sources: first, language in South 
Carolina v. Katzenbach, a prior case addressing the constitutionality 
of section 5 of the VRA;30 and second, case law applying the “equal 
footing doctrine,” which ensures that all new states enter the Union 
on an equal footing with their predecessors.31 Neither of these sources 
supports NAMUDNO’s dicta. Although a third set of cases not cited 
in NAMUDNO—those interpreting the Tenth Amendment—might 
provide a more persuasive basis for an equal treatment principle, 
these decisions likewise do not suggest a need for heightened scrutiny 
of the VRA’s unequal treatment of states.32 
A. Katzenbach and the Reconstruction Amendments 
The Court in NAMUDNO appeared to base its equal sover-
eignty principle in part on Katzenbach. In that case, decided in 1966, 
the Supreme Court upheld VRA section 5 as a proper remedy for un-
constitutional discrimination and denial of voting rights.33 The 
NAMUDNO Court, however, invoked Katzenbach as support for a 
principle of state equal treatment that could cast doubt on the validity 
of VRA section 5. Quoting Katzenbach, the Court observed: 
“Distinctions [between states] can be justified in some cases. ‘The 
doctrine of the equality of States . . . does not bar . . . remedies for 
local evils which have subsequently appeared.’”34 
Note the ellipses and added emphasis. The quote in NAMUDNO 
 
 30  383 U.S. 301 (1966). See infra Part II.A for further discussion of Katzenbach. 
 31  See infra Part II.B for further discussion of the doctrine. 
 32  See infra Part II.C for further discussion of the sufficiency of political safeguards in 
protecting state sovereignty. 
 33  South Carolina v. Katzenbach, 383 U.S. 301, 337 (1966). The central issue before 
the Court this term is whether the record today still justifies section 5’s coverage. See 
Shelby Cnty. v. Holder, 133 S. Ct. 594 (2012); see also Nw. Austin Mun. Util. Dist. No. 
One v. Holder (NAMUDNO), 557 U.S. 193, 202 (2009) (“Some of the conditions that we 
relied upon in upholding this statutory scheme in Katzenbach . . . have unquestionably 
improved.”). 
 34  NAMUDNO, 557 U.S. at 203 (alteration in original) (quoting Katzenbach, 383 U.S. 
at 328–29). 
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omits key phrases from Katzenbach, thereby reversing the implication 
of the quoted passage. The Court in Katzenbach observed, with re-
spect to section 5, that “[i]n acceptable legislative fashion, Congress 
chose to limit its attention to the geographic areas where immediate 
action seemed necessary.”35 It then stated: “The doctrine of the equal-
ity of States, invoked by South Carolina, does not bar this approach, 
for that doctrine applies only to the terms upon which States are 
admitted to the Union, and not to the remedies for local evils which 
have subsequently appeared.”36 As a citation in the opinion makes 
clear, the italicized portion of this statement refers to the equal foot-
ing doctrine.37 The Katzenbach opinion thus concludes—correctly, as 
explained below38—that the equal footing doctrine applies only to the 
terms on which states are admitted to the Union, not to other or sub-
sequent legislation that addresses local problems. Far from support-
ing a principle of state equal treatment, the statement from 
Katzenbach quoted in NAMUDNO denied that any such principle 
exists. 
It would be particularly surprising to apply a principle of state 
equal treatment to Congress’s enforcement powers under the 
Fourteenth and Fifteenth Amendments. These two amendments were 
adopted during Reconstruction principally to address concerns about 
discrimination against former slaves.39 Thus, although the Fourteenth 
and Fifteenth Amendments guarantee voting rights and equal protec-
tion of the laws throughout the nation, and although Congress typi-
cally has enforced them with general, nationwide legislation, there is 
little doubt that their drafters were concerned principally with dis-
criminatory practices concentrated in one region of the country—the 
former Confederacy. 
In fact, in the Civil Rights Cases, a seminal early decision inter-
preting the Fourteenth Amendment, the Supreme Court struck down 
the Civil Rights Act of 1875 precisely because it did not discriminate 
 
 35  383 U.S. at 328.  
 36  Id. at 328–29 (emphasis added). 
 37  Id. at 329 (citing the equal footing decision Coyle v. Smith, 221 U.S. 559 (1911)).  
 38  See infra Part II.B (arguing that the equal footing doctrine does not require that 
federal legislation treat states equally). 
 39  See ERIC FONER, RECONSTRUCTION: AMERICA’S UNFINISHED REVOLUTION, 
1863–1877, at 446 (1988) (identifying the “concern of the Fifteenth Amendment’s drafters 
“to enfranchise blacks in the border states and prevent a retreat from Reconstruction in 
the South[] ”); John Harrison, The Lawfulness of the Reconstruction Amendments, 68 U. 
CHI. L. REV. 375, 401–02 & nn.137–44 (2001) (discussing the Fourteenth Amendment 
drafters’ objective of repealing southern Black Codes, which limited the rights of freed 
slaves).  
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between states.40 The 1875 Act guaranteed “full and equal enjoy-
ment” of various public accommodations to “citizens of every race 
and color, regardless of any previous condition of servitude.”41 The 
Supreme Court held that this legislation was unconstitutionally over-
broad because it “applie[d] equally to cases arising in States which 
have the justest laws respecting the personal rights of citizens, and 
whose authorities are ever ready to enforce such laws, as to those 
which arise in States that may have violated the prohibition of the 
amendment.”42 Today, courts typically cite the Civil Rights Cases for 
the proposition that the Fourteenth Amendment applies only to 
“state action” and thus does not permit Congress to ban private dis-
crimination.43 Modern doctrine, moreover, likely would not support 
facial invalidation of the 1875 Act based on the putative unconstitu-
tionality of its application to particular states.44 Nevertheless, the 
holding of the Civil Rights Cases—that the Fourteenth Amendment 
requires Congress to differentiate between states—highlights the 
irony in NAMUDNO’s suggestion that some unenumerated, implicit 
requirement of the Constitution may prohibit such disparate treat-
ment of states. 
B. Flat-Footed Use of Equal Footing 
The Court in NAMUDNO also appeared to base its “tradition” 
of “equal sovereignty” on the equal footing doctrine—the 
constitutional principle that all states enter the Union on an equal 
footing with their predecessors.45 The equal footing doctrine, how-
ever, provides no support for a requirement of equal treatment of 
states in federal legislation. Quite the opposite, by upholding provi-
sions unique to particular states, the equal footing case law estab-
lishes that Congress may treat states unequally. 
 
 40  109 U.S. 3, 14 (1883) (striking down the Act because it applied equally to states that 
had not violated the Fourteenth Amendment).  
 41  Civil Rights Act of 1875, ch. 114, 18 Stat. 335, 336.  
 42  The Civil Rights Cases, 109 U.S. at 14.  
 43  See, e.g., United States v. Morrison, 529 U.S. 598, 621 (2000). 
 44  See Michael W. McConnell, Originalism and the Desegregation Decisions, 81 VA. L. 
REV. 947, 1091 (1995) (“Under current approaches to constitutional adjudication, the 
Civil Rights Cases would not be decided the same way . . . .”). 
 45  While the Court was not explicit about its reliance on the equal footing doctrine, it 
cited an equal footing case, United States v. Louisiana, 363 U.S. 1 (1960) (citing Pollard v. 
Hagan, 44 U.S. (3 How.) 212, 232 (1845)), as its only substantial authority for this 
proposition. Nw. Austin Mun. Util. Dist. No. One v. Holder (NAMUDNO), 557 U.S. 193, 
203 (2009). The Court also cited Texas v. White, 74 U.S. (7 Wall.) 700 (1869), signaled with 
a “see also.” Id. That case held simply that Texas had no right to secede from the Union 
because the Constitution establishes “an indestructible Union, composed of indestructible 
States.” White, 74 U.S. (7 Wall.) at 725.  
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The equal footing doctrine addresses a specific constitutional 
problem. Congress has authority under the Constitution to admit new 
states to the Union.46 Congress might be tempted to use this authority 
to impose conditions or constraints on new states that it could not 
constitutionally impose on existing states.47 And in fact, historically, 
Congress not only required territories to meet numerous conditions 
before qualifying for statehood, but also imposed numerous require-
ments on them as conditions for their ultimate admission as states. 
The equal footing doctrine, which the Court first articulated in 
the 1830s,48 provides that such conditions are enforceable only if 
Congress could have imposed them on an existing state.49 A state is a 
state is a state, in other words. Insofar as the Constitution establishes 
the distribution of sovereign powers between the states and the fed-
eral government—through, for example, the enumeration of specific, 
limited powers of Congress, the protection of sovereign immunity for 
states under the Eleventh Amendment, and specific guarantees like 
the Port Guarantee Clause—that distribution applies to all states, 
 
 46  U.S. CONST. art. IV, § 3, cl. 1. 
 47  This risk is not fanciful. At the Constitutional Convention, one delegate 
(Gouverneur Morris of Pennsylvania) opposed language in the state admission clause that 
would have required explicitly that new states enter the Union on equal terms with old 
ones. MAX FARRAND, THE FRAMING OF THE CONSTITUTION OF THE UNITED STATES 
109 (1913). This delegate later confessed in a letter his view that additional territory 
acquired in Louisiana and elsewhere should be formed into “provinces” of the United 
States rather than co-equal states of the Union. Id. at 144. As discussed below, moreover, 
Congress did impose conditions on some states that sought to impair aspects of their 
fundamental sovereignty under the Constitution. See infra notes 52–57 and accompanying 
text (discussing Oklahoma admission conditions). 
 48  See, e.g., Mayor of New Orleans v. De Armas, 34 U.S. 224, 235 (1835). The phrase 
“equal footing” appeared in the Northwest Ordinance, which promised that new states 
formed out of the territory covered by the ordinance would enter the Union “on an equal 
footing” with the original states. An Act to Provide for the Government of the Territory 
Northwest of the River Ohio, art. V, ch. 8, 1 Stat. 50, 53 n.a (1789). Nearly every state 
admission statute has declared the new state to be admitted to the Union on an “equal 
footing” or the “same footing” with predecessor states. See Valerie J.M. Brader, 
Congress’s Pet: Why the Clean Air Act’s Favoritism of California Is Unconstitutional Under 
the Equal Footing Doctrine, 13 HASTINGS W.-NW. J. ENVTL. L. & POL’Y 119, 135 & n.74 
(2007) (collecting statutes). Early Supreme Court cases were ambiguous as to whether the 
equal footing doctrine derived from the Constitution or from statutory language of the 
Northwest Ordinance and state admission statutes, but in 1845 the Court made clear that 
the doctrine is constitutional in nature. Compare De Armas, 34 U.S. at 235–36 (discussing 
the statute admitting Louisiana on an equal footing with earlier states), with Pollard, 44 
U.S. (3 How.) at 223 (indicating that certain stipulations in an admission statute could be 
“void and inoperative”). 
 49  See, e.g., Coyle v. Smith, 221 U.S. 559, 570 (1911) (rejecting “the contention that any 
State may be deprived of any of the power constitutionally possessed by other States, as 
States, by reason of the terms in which the acts admitting them to the Union have been 
framed”).  
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whether admitted to the Union in 1789 or, like Alaska and Hawaii, in 
1959.50 The equal footing principle says nothing about whether fed-
eral legislation, validly enacted pursuant to Congress’s enumerated 
powers, must treat states equally. Insofar as Congress could treat the 
original states unequally, it can do the same to new states—as indeed 
it did in some admission conditions upheld by the Supreme Court un-
der the equal footing doctrine.51 
The case law makes this point clear. A classic example of the 
doctrine is Coyle v. Smith.52 In Oklahoma’s admission statute, 
Congress required the state to accept, as a condition of its admission, 
that its capital could not be moved from the city of Guthrie until at 
least 1913.53 Oklahoma accepted this condition, and President 
Roosevelt admitted the state to the Union by proclamation on 
November 16, 1907.54 In 1910, however, the Oklahoma legislature vio-
lated the condition by passing a statute moving the capital to 
Oklahoma City.55 Although a Guthrie landowner argued that the 
state statute was invalid because it violated the federal admission 
statute,56 the Supreme Court held that the admission condition requir-
ing the state capital to remain in Guthrie was unenforceable.57 “The 
power[s] to locate its own seat of government, and to determine when 
and how it shall be changed from one place to another, and to appro-
priate its own public funds for that purpose,” the Court reasoned, 
“are essentially and peculiarly state powers.”58 In other words, 
Congress was using its power to admit new states to the Union to 
 
 50  The Constitution’s specification of states’ governmental powers and immunities 
distinguishes them from two other types of local government in the United States: 
territorial governments and Native American tribes. Under governing case law, Congress 
holds “plenary” authority to modify the degree of sovereignty exercised by territories and 
Indian tribes. See generally Zachary S. Price, Dividing Sovereignty in Tribal and Territorial 
Criminal Jurisdiction, 113 COLUM. L. REV. (forthcoming 2013) (manuscript at 3–4) (on 
file with the New York University Law Review). 
 51  For a contrary argument—that the equal footing doctrine requires equivalent 
“political sovereignty” for all states and thus renders unconstitutional the Clean Air Act 
provisions disparately treating California—see Brader, supra note 48, at 155. This contrary 
view fails to account for the limitations of the equal footing doctrine identified in the 
discussion here. 
 52  221 U.S. 559 (1911).  
 53  Oklahoma Enabling Act of June 16, 1906, ch. 3335, 34 Stat. 267, 269.  
 54  Proclamation No. 780, reprinted in 35 Stat. 2160 (1907); see also 34 Stat. at 271. 
Following a common procedure for admission statutes, the statute authorized the 
President to admit the state by proclamation if he deemed the statutory conditions for 
admission satisfied. 34 Stat. at 271.  
 55  See Coyle, 221 U.S. at 563. 
 56  Id. 
 57  Id. at 579. 
 58  Id. at 565.  
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impose conditions on Oklahoma that it could not constitutionally im-
pose on existing states. Accordingly, the condition in the admission 
statute was invalid under the equal footing doctrine. 
As the Court explained in Coyle, Congress’s power to admit new 
states to the Union is not a power “to admit political organizations 
which are less or greater, or different in dignity or power, from those 
political entities which constitute the Union.”59 Rather, “[t]he power 
is to admit new States into this Union.”60 “This Union was and is a un-
ion of States, equal in power, dignity, and authority, each competent 
to exert that residuum of sovereignty not delegated to the United 
States by the Constitution itself.”61 Thus, conditions in admissions 
statutes are unenforceable insofar as they “operate[] to restrict the 
powers of [the] new state in respect of matters which would otherwise 
be exclusively within the sphere of state power.”62  
The Coyle Court was careful, however, to distinguish two other 
types of conditions. First, the equal footing doctrine imposes no limit 
on Congress’s power to set conditions that must be fulfilled prior to 
the state’s admission to the Union.63 In fact, Congress made extensive 
use of admission conditions to influence the constitutions, laws, poli-
tics, and social conditions in territories before admitting them as 
states, particularly in cases where Congress feared the new state 
might be difficult to assimilate into mainstream American society.64 
Coyle makes clear that the equal footing doctrine places no limit on 
such admission conditions. The doctrine simply prevents Congress 
from continuing to burden the state with such conditions after the 
state’s admission. 
Second, the equal footing doctrine does not bar the effect of 
conditions in admission statutes that “are within the scope of the con-
ceded powers of Congress over the subject.”65 In other words, if 
Congress could have enacted the provision pursuant to its usual enu-
merated powers, the fact that the provision appears in a state 
admission statute does not affect its enforceability.66 In that 
 
 59  Id. at 566.  
 60  Id. at 567 (internal quotation marks omitted). 
 61  Id. (internal quotation marks omitted).  
 62  Id. at 568.  
 63  See id. (“Congress may require, under penalty of denying admission, that the 
organic law of a new State at the time of admission shall be such as to meet its approval.”). 
 64  See Eric Biber, The Price of Admission: Causes, Effects, and Patterns of Conditions 
Imposed on States Entering the Union, 46 AM. J. LEGAL HIST. 119, 121 (2004). 
 65  Coyle, 221 U.S. at 568; id. at 574. 
 66  The Court explained that Congress may “embrace in an enactment introducing a 
new state into the Union” legislation that regulates interstate commerce or otherwise falls 
“within the sphere of the plain power of Congress.” Id. at 574. Such conditions are 
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circumstance, enforcement of the condition does not impair the 
state’s equal sovereignty with other states, because Congress could 
have enacted the provision in any case, even after the state’s admis-
sion. 
This reasoning takes for granted that valid federal legislation 
may affect states unequally. Legislation admitting a state, by defini-
tion, affects only that state and not others, but the Court did not view 
this feature of the legislation as problematic. To the contrary, it pre-
sumed Congress could employ its usual legislative powers to adopt 
such legislation.67 In fact, in other cases, the Court has upheld admis-
sion conditions that have a disparate impact on states, so long as the 
conditions are a valid exercise of congressional power. In United 
States v. Sandoval, the Court upheld admission conditions prescribing 
that certain areas of New Mexico would qualify as “Indian country” 
subject to federal regulation pursuant to Congress’s authority over 
Indian affairs.68 The Court did not ask whether Congress had identi-
fied comparable areas of other states as Indian country. It was enough 
that the legislation had a valid constitutional basis in Congress’s enu-
merated powers.69 Similarly, in Minnesota v. Mille Lacs Band of 
Chippewa Indians, the Court held that an Indian tribe’s hunting and 
fishing rights under a federal treaty remained enforceable notwith-
standing Congress’s subsequent admission of the territory in which 
the tribe’s lands were located as a state of the Union.70 The state ar-
gued that its admission to the Union on an equal footing with other 
states abrogated the tribe’s treaty rights, because authority over 
 
permissible because  
in every such case such legislation would derive its force not from any agreement 
or compact with the proposed new state, nor by reason of its acceptance of such 
enactment as a term of admission, but solely because the power of Congress 
extended to the subject, and therefore would not operate to restrict the state’s 
legislative power in respect of any matter which was not plainly within the 
regulating power of Congress. 
Id.  
 67  Id. 
 68  231 U.S. 28, 38 (1913). 
 69  Id. at 49 (“Being a legitimate exercise of [Congress’s] power [over Indian affairs], 
the legislation in question does not encroach upon the police power of the state, or disturb 
the principle of equality among the states.”). The Court’s reasoning in Sandoval is quite 
unattractive in other respects. Reflecting the biases of its time, it describes the Pueblo 
communities at issue in the case as “essentially a simple, uninformed, and inferior people.” 
Id. at 39. The principle of federal authority over Indian affairs on which the Court’s 
holding turns, however, remains a cornerstone of federal Indian law. See, e.g., United 
States v. Jicarilla Apache Nation, 131 S. Ct. 2313, 2323–24 (2011) (collecting cases 
establishing Congress’s “plenary authority” over Indian affairs). 
 70  526 U.S. 172, 204–05 (1999). 
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natural resources is a fundamental attribute of state sovereignty.71 
The Court rejected this view. According to the Court, the treaty 
remained enforceable because it reflected a valid exercise of federal 
power under the Constitution: “Although States have important 
interests in regulating wildlife and natural resources within their 
borders, this authority is shared with the Federal Government when 
the Federal Government exercises one of its enumerated 
constitutional powers, such as treaty making.”72 
Other cases exhibit similar reasoning with respect to federal 
property rights. In Stearns v. Minnesota, the Court addressed the va-
lidity of provisions in Minnesota’s admission statute that ceded fed-
eral land to the state on the condition that the state preserve certain 
tax breaks for a railroad operating on the land.73 The Court upheld 
these provisions on the grounds that Congress could have imposed 
them on any state as a condition of cession of federal land.74 The 
Court did not ask whether Congress had imposed the same conditions 
in other land deals, nor whether Congress had granted other states 
comparable land cessions; it presumed that the cession to Minnesota 
was a valid exercise of congressional authority over federal property. 
The Court later elaborated on this point in United States v. Texas, ex-
plaining that the equal footing doctrine was not designed to eliminate 
the inevitable economic diversity among states, but rather “to create 
parity as respects political standing and sovereignty.”75 Congress 
therefore may enter “special agreements” with states or otherwise 
legislate for them unequally; the only parity required by the equal 
footing doctrine is the limitation of Congress to its proper enumer-
ated powers in enacting such legislation.76 
In fairness, as some equal footing cases themselves attest, the 
proper boundary between federal and state authority—and thus the 
fundamental attributes of state sovereignty that are protected by the 
equal footing doctrine—may itself be contested. For example, one 
such area of contention concerns state regulatory authority over cer-
tain waterways and submerged lands. In 1842, the Supreme Court 
held that the original thirteen states retained “the absolute right to all 
 
 71  Id. at 202–04. 
 72  Id. at 204. 
 73  179 U.S. 223 (1900). 
 74  Id. at 251–52. 
 75  339 U.S. 707, 716 (1950). The Court noted that the equal footing principle cannot 
purport to eliminate disparities among states stemming from “[a]rea, location, geology and 
latitude,” given that “[t]here has never been equality among the states in that sense.” Id.  
 76  Id. at 716–17.  
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their navigable waters and the soils under them.”77 Extending this 
principle to later-admitted states under the equal footing doctrine, the 
Court has held that all states retain title, by virtue of the Constitution, 
to “beds of waters” that were navigable at the time of admission or 
that are “tidally influenced.”78 In one of the earliest cases on this is-
sue, however, dissenting Justices complained that the state’s title to 
submerged lands presented a question of property rather than sover-
eignty, and thus that “the United States did not part with the right of 
soil by enabling a state to assume political jurisdiction.”79 
Insofar as the category of fundamental sovereign powers pro-
tected by the equal footing doctrine is malleable, one might assert 
that the powers burdened by section 5 of the VRA—that is, state and 
local authority over state and local election rules and procedures—
should be protected, making unequal regulation of such state 
authorities suspect. But this theory would turn the Fourteenth and 
Fifteenth Amendment inquiry on its head. To the extent that federal 
civil rights legislation properly remedies unconstitutional forms of 
discrimination, it falls squarely within the enforcement powers con-
ferred upon Congress by the Fourteenth and Fifteenth Amendments. 
As such, it is “plainly within the regulating power of Congress,” and 
therefore not within the reserved sovereignty of states protected by 
the equal footing doctrine.80 Even the submerged land cases 
acknowledge that states take title subject to “the paramount power of 
the United States to control such waters for purpose of navigation 
and in interstate and foreign commerce.”81 State authority over elec-
tions is no less subject to Congress’s “paramount power” to protect 
federal constitutional rights. Indeed, as discussed above, it would be 
particularly perverse to apply a principle of state equal treatment to 
block legislation enacted pursuant to the Reconstruction 
Amendments, given their origins in an effort to protect rights of a 
particular group of people (former slaves) in a particular region of the 
country (the former Confederacy).82 
In sum, the equal footing doctrine provides no support for a gen-
eral requirement that federal legislation treat states equally. Quite the 
opposite: The very cases elaborating the doctrine make clear that 
Congress can treat states unequally, so long as it employs its proper 
 
 77  Martin v. Lessee of Waddell, 41 U.S. (16 Pet.) 367, 410 (1842). 
 78  PPL Montana, LLC v. Montana, 132 S. Ct. 1215, 1227–28 (2012). 
 79  Pollard v. Hagan, 44 U.S. (3 How.) 212, 235 (1845) (Catron, J., dissenting).  
 80  Coyle v. Smith, 221 U.S. 559, 574 (1911). 
 81  PPL Montana, 132 S. Ct. at 1228 (quoting United States v. Oregon, 295 U.S. 1, 14 
(1935)). 
 82  See supra Part II.A. 
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legislative powers. 
C. Political Safeguards of Federalism 
A final possible basis for a principle of state equal treatment may 
be found in two cases the NAMUDNO opinion did not cite, South 
Carolina v. Baker83 and Garcia v. San Antonio Metropolitan Transit 
Authority.84 In these cases, the Supreme Court discussed the “limits 
on Congress’s authority to regulate state activities”85 imposed by the 
Tenth Amendment, which provides that powers not conferred by the 
Constitution upon the federal government are reserved to the states 
(or “the people” more generally).86 Baker and Garcia abandoned ear-
lier decisions that suggested that the Tenth Amendment might pro-
tect states against certain forms of federal regulation.87 The Court 
held instead that constitutional protections against burdensome fed-
eral regulation are “structural, not substantive—i.e., that States must 
find their protection from congressional regulation through the na-
tional political process, not through judicially defined spheres of un-
regulable state activity.”88 Nevertheless, the Baker Court did leave 
open the possibility that “some extraordinary defects in the national 
political process might render congressional regulation of state activi-
ties invalid under the Tenth Amendment.”89  
It might be argued that section 5 of the VRA is suspect because 
some breakdown in the political process led to its unequal coverage 
of particular states. But it seems doubtful that any breakdown in the 
political process with respect to this statute was sufficiently extreme 
to fall within the Garcia/Baker exception. Some scholars, to be sure, 
have argued that the current coverage formula resulted from a failure 
of political will to develop a more sensible formula when Congress 
last reauthorized the VRA in 2006.90 Although Congress reauthorized 
section 5 of the VRA several times since 1965, in 2006 it made no 
change to the coverage formula chosen in the last reauthorization in 
1982, even though that formula relied on arguably out-of-date data 
 
 83  485 U.S. 505 (1988). 
 84  469 U.S. 528 (1985). 
 85  Baker, 485 U.S. at 505. 
 86  U.S. CONST. amend. X. 
 87  See Garcia, 469 U.S. at 557 (overruling the holding of National League of Cities v. 
Usery, 426 U.S. 833 (1976), that Congress lacks authority under the Commerce Clause to 
impose labor standards on state governments); Baker, 485 U.S. at 512 (discussing Garcia). 
 88  Baker, 485 U.S. at 512.  
 89  Id. (discussing Garcia).  
 90  See, e.g., Nathaniel Persily, The Promise and Pitfalls of the New Voting Rights Act, 
117 YALE L.J. 174, 208–09 (2007) (arguing that “a debate over the coverage formula” in 
2006 “likely would have led to the complete unraveling of the bill”). 
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from 1972.91 In 1982, however, Congress did expand the VRA’s 
bailout provisions, making it easier—particularly under the saving 
construction adopted in NAMUDNO—for jurisdictions to escape sec-
tion 5’s strictures if they are no longer appropriate for that jurisdic-
tion.92 These bailout provisions may substantially mitigate the over-
inclusiveness of the coverage formula based on practices in 1972. 
In any event, invalidation of section 5 under the Tenth 
Amendment based on political process defects would require an in-
tensive examination of the legislative process that led to the 
reauthorization. As a general matter, by emphasizing that political 
safeguards are ordinarily sufficient to protect state sovereignty from 
excessive federal intrusion, the Court’s Tenth Amendment cases 
reinforce the proposition that unequal treatment of states is permissi-
ble. Special scrutiny is appropriate under this line of cases only if evi-
dence establishes that the legislation resulted from a severe 
breakdown of the normal political process. 
CONCLUSION 
NAMUDNO’s suggestion that legislation treating states une-
qually is suspect is without foundation. It threatens, moreover, to 
cause much mischief. States are unequal, and Congress may have ra-
tional reasons to treat them unequally, as it does in numerous forms 
of routine legislation. The political process is sufficient to ensure that 
the losers today may be winners tomorrow. Courts should not over-
ride the outcomes of this political give-and-take through probing re-
view of such legislation. 
 
 
 91  See generally Nw. Austin Mun. Util. Dist. No. One v. Holder (NAMUDNO), 557 
U.S. 193, 200 (2009) (discussing reauthorizations). 
 92 Voting Rights Act Amendments of 1982, Pub. L. No. 97-205, 96 Stat. 131 (codified 
at 42 U.S.C. § 1973b(a)(1) (2006)) (amending the provision that determines coverage of 
section 5). For a description of the changes and their practical effect, see Shelby Cnty. v. 
Holder, 679 F.3d 848, 856 (D.C. Cir.), cert. granted in part, 133 S. Ct. 594 (2012). 
